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THE EXCHANGE VALUE EMBEDDED IN A TRANSPORT SYSTEM
QINGLAN XIA AND SHAOFENG XU
Abstract. This paper shows that a well designed transport system has an embedded exchange
value by serving as a market for potential exchange between consumers. Under suitable conditions,
one can improve the welfare of consumers in the system simply by allowing some exchange of goods
between consumers during transportation without incurring additional transportation costs. We
propose an explicit valuation formula to measure this exchange value for a given compatible
transport system. This value is always nonnegative and bounded from above. Criteria based on
transport structures, preferences and prices are provided to determine the existence of a positive
exchange value. Finally, we study a new optimal transport problem with an objective taking into
account of both transportation cost and exchange value.
1. Introduction
A transport system is used to move goods from sources to targets. In building such a system,
one typically aims at minimizing the total transportation cost. This consideration has motivated
the theoretical studies of many optimal transport problems. For instance, the well-known Monge-
Kantorovich problem (e.g. [1], [3], [4], [16], [18], [20], [24], [26], [31]) studies how to find an optimal
transport map or transport plan between two general probability measures with the optimality being
measured by minimizing some cost function. Applications of the Monge-Kantorovich problem to
economics may be found in the literature such as [21], [8] and [17]. The present paper gives
another application by introducing the economics notion of an “exchange value” which is suitable
for a ramified transport system. Ramified optimal transportation has been recently proposed and
studied (e.g. [19], [33], [25], [34] , [6], [8], [36], [11], [29], [7], [37], [38]) to model a branching transport
system. An essential feature of such a transportation is to favor transportation in groups via a cost
function which depends concavely on quantity. Transport systems with such branching structures
are observable not only in nature as in trees, blood vessels, river channel networks, lightning, etc.
but also in efficiently designed transport systems such as used in railway configurations and postage
delivery networks. Those studies have focused on the cost value of a branching transport system in
terms of its effectiveness in reducing transportation cost.
In this article, we show that there is another value, named as exchange value, embedded in
some ramified transport systems. As an illustration, we consider a spacial economy with two
goods located at two distinct points {x1, x2} and two consumers living at two different locations
{y1, y2}. The spacial distribution is shown in Figure 1. Suppose consumer 1 favors good 2 more
than good 1. However, good 2 may be more expensive than good 1 for some reason such as a higher
transportation fee. As a result, she buys good 1 despite the fact that it is not her favorite. On the
contrary, consumer 2 favors good 1 but ends up buying good 2, as good 1 is more expensive than
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(a) G1 (b) G2
Figure 1. Unlike a traditional transport system G1, a ramified transport system
G2 provides an exchange value.
good 2 for him. Given this purchase plan, a traditional transporter will ship the ordered items in
a transport system like G1 (see Figure 1a). However, as shown in [33] etc, a transport system like
G2 (see Figure 1b) with some branching structure might be more cost efficient than G1. One may
save some transportation cost by using a transport system like G2 instead of G1. Now, we observe
another very interesting phenomenon about G2. When using this transport system, one can simply
switch the items which leads to consumer 1 getting good 2 and consumer 2 receives good 1. This
exchange of items makes both consumers better off since they both get what they prefer. More
importantly, no extra transportation cost is incurred during this exchange process. In other words,
a ramified transport system like G2 may possess an exchange value, which cannot be found in other
transport systems like G1.
The exchange value concept of a transport system that we propose here is valuable for both
economics and mathematics. Existing market theories (e.g. [2], [12], [13], [14], [22], [23], [27],
[30]) focus on the mechanism of exchanges between economic agents on an abstract market with
relatively few discussions on its form. Our study complements the existing theories by showing that
a transport system actually serves as a concrete market whose friction for exchange depends on
the structure of the transport system as well as factors like preferences, prices, spatial distribution,
etc. The existence of such an exchange value is due to the fact that the transport system provides
a medium for potential exchange between agents. From the perspective of mathematical theory
on optimal transport problem, our study provides another rationale for ramified structure which
usually implies a potential exchange value. Furthermore, a new optimality criterion needs to be
considered when building a transport system which leads to a new mathematical problem. Instead
of simply minimizing the transportation cost, one might have to minimize the difference between
transportation cost and exchange value.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment
with a brief review of consumer’s problem and related concepts from ramified optimal transporta-
tion. Sections 3 and 4 contain the main results of the paper. Section 3 proposes an explicit valuation
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formula to measure the exchange value for a given compatible transport system. The exchange value
is defined by solving a maximization problem, which has a unique solution under suitable condi-
tions. Criteria based on transport structures, preferences and prices are provided to determine the
existence of a positive exchange value. We show that a reasonable combinations of these factors
guarantees a positive exchange value. Section 4 studies a new optimal transport problem with an
objective taking into account of both transportation cost and exchange value.
In this paper, we will use the following notations:
• X: a compact convex subset of a Euclidean space Rm.
• Rk+: a subset of Rk defined as
{
(x1, ..., xk) ∈ Rk : xi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., k
}
.
• Rk++: a subset of Rk defined as
{
(x1, ..., xk) ∈ Rk : xi > 0, i = 1, ..., k
}
.
• pj : a price vector in Rk++ faced by consumer j , j = 1, ..., `.
• qj : a consumption vector in Rk+ of consumer j, j = 1, ..., `.
• E : an economy as defined in (2.1).
• q¯: the consumption plan as defined in (2.2).
• ej (pj , u˜j): the expenditure function of consumer j, j = 1, ..., `, as defined in (2.3).
• a: the atomic measure representing sources of goods, see ( 2.4).
• b: the atomic measure representing consumers, see (2.5).
• G: a transport path from a to b.
• q: a transport plan from a to b.
• S(q): the total expenditure function as defined in (3.1).
• Ω (q¯): the set of all transport paths compatible with q¯, as defined in (3.2).
• FG: the set of all feasible transport plans of G as defined in (3.3).
• V (G): the exchange value of a transport path G, as defined in (3.7).
• Mα (G): the transportation cost of a transport path G as defined in (4.1).
2. Consumer’s Problem and Ramified Optimal Transportation
2.1. Consumer’s Problem. Suppose there are k sources of different goods which could be pur-
chased by ` consumers distributed on X. Each source xi ∈ X supplies only one type of goods,
i = 1, ..., k. Each consumer j located at yj ∈ X derives utility from consuming k goods according
to a utility function uj : Rk+ → R : (q1j , ..., qkj) 7→ uj , j = 1, ..., `, where uj : Rk+ → R is continuous,
concave and increasing , j = 1, ..., `. Each consumer j has an initial wealth wj > 0 and faces a
price vector pj = (p1j , ..., pkj) ∈ Rk++, j = 1, ..., k. We allow the prices to vary across consumers to
accommodate the situation where consumers on different locations may have to pay different prices
for the same good. This variation could be possibly due to different transportation fees. We denote
this economy as
(2.1) E = (U,P,W ;x, y) .
Now, we give a brief review of a consumer’s decision problem. Discussions of these materials can
be found in most advanced microeconomics texts (e.g. [27]). Each consumer j will choose an utility
maximizing consumption plan given the price pj and wealth wj . More precisely, the consumption
plan q¯j is derived from the following utility maximizing problem:
(2.2) q¯j ∈ arg max
{
uj (qj) | qj ∈ Rk+, pj · qj ≤ wj
}
.
Given the continuity and concavity of uj , we know this problem has a solution.
4 QINGLAN XIA AND SHAOFENG XU
As will be used in defining the exchange value, we also consider the expenditure minimizing
problem for a given utility level u˜j > uj (0):
(2.3) ej (pj , u˜j) = min
{
pj · qj | qj ∈ Rk+, uj (qj) ≥ u˜j
}
,
which is actually a problem dual to the above utility maximization problem. The continuity and
concavity of uj guarantee a solution to this minimization problem. Here, ej (pj , u˜j) represents the
minimal expenditure needed for consumer j to reach a utility level u˜j . Since u˜j > uj (0), we know
that ej (pj , u˜j) > 0. Lemma 2.1 (see [27]) shows several standard properties of the expenditure
function ej .
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that uj is a continuous, increasing utility function on Rk+. The expenditure
function ej (pj , u˜j) is
(1) Homogeneous of degree one in pj .
(2) Strictly increasing in u˜j and nondecreasing in pij for any i = 1, ..., k.
(3) Concave in pj .
(4) Continuous in pj and u˜j .
The following lemma shows a nice property of ej when uj is homogeneous. This property will
be used in the next section to characterize the solution set of the maximization problem defining
exchange value.
Lemma 2.2. If uj : Rk+ → R is homogeneous of degree βj > 0, then ej (pj , u˜j) is homogeneous of
degree 1βj in u˜j, which implies
ej (pj , u˜j) = ej (pj , 1) (u˜j)
1
βj .
Proof. For any λ > 0, since uj is homogeneous of degree βj , we have
ej (pj , λu˜j) = min
{
pj · qj | qj ∈ Rk+, uj (qj) ≥ λu˜j
}
= min
{
pj · qj | qj ∈ Rk+, uj
(
(1/λ)
1/βj qj
)
≥ u˜j
}
= min
{
(λ)
1/βj pj · q˜j | q˜j ∈ Rk+, uj (q˜j) ≥ u˜j
}
, where q˜j = (1/λ)
1/βjqj ,
= (λ)
1/βj ej (pj , u˜j) .
Therefore, ej (pj , u˜j) is homogeneous of degree
1
βj
in u˜j . 
2.2. Ramified Optimal Transportation. Let X be a compact convex subset of a Euclidean
space Rm. Recall that a Radon measure a on X is atomic if a is a finite sum of Dirac measures
with positive multiplicities. That is
a =
k∑
i=1
miδxi
for some integer k ≥ 1 and some points xi ∈ X, mi > 0 for each i = 1, · · · , k.
In the environment of the previous section, the k sources of goods can be represented as an
atomic measure on X by
(2.4) a =
k∑
i=1
miδxi , where mi =
∑`
j=1
q¯ij ,
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where q¯j = (q¯1j , · · · , qkj) is given by (2.2). Also, the ` consumers can be represented by another
atomic measure on X by
(2.5) b =
∑`
j=1
njδyj , where nj =
k∑
i=1
q¯ij .
Without loss of generality, we may assume that∑
ij
q¯ij = 1,
and thus both a and b are probability measures on X.
Definition 2.1. ([33]) A transport path from a to b is a weighted directed graph G consists of a
vertex set V (G), a directed edge set E (G) and a weight function w : E (G) → (0,+∞) such that
{x1, x2, ..., xk} ∪ {y1, y2, ..., y`} ⊆ V (G) and for any vertex v ∈ V (G), there is a balance equation
(2.6)
∑
e∈E(G),e−=v
w(e) =
∑
e∈E(G),e+=v
w(e) +
 mi, if v = xi for some i = 1, ..., k−nj , if v = yj for some j = 1, ..., `
0, otherwise
where each edge e ∈ E (G) is a line segment from the starting endpoint e− to the ending endpoint
e+.
Note that the balance equation (2.6) simply means the conservation of mass at each vertex.
Viewing G as a one dimensional polyhedral chain, we have the equation ∂G = b− a.
Let
Path (a,b)
be the space of all transport paths from a to b.
Definition 2.2. (e.g. [1], [31]) A transport plan from a to b is an atomic probability measure
(2.7) q =
k∑
i=1
∑`
j=1
qijδ(xi,yj)
in the product space X ×X such that
(2.8)
k∑
i=1
qij = nj and
∑`
j=1
qij = mi
for each i and j. Denote Plan (a,b) as the space of all transport plans from a to b.
For instance, the q¯ given by (2.2) is a transport plan in Plan (a,b).
Now, we want to consider the compatibility between a pair of transport path and transport plan
([33], [7]). Let G be a given transport path in Path (a,b). From now on, we assume that for each
xi and yj , there exists at most one directed polyhedral curve gij from xi to yj . In other words,
there exists a list of distinct vertices
(2.9) V (gij) := {vi1 , vi2 , · · · , vih}
in V (G) with xi = vi1 , yj = vih , and each
[
vit , vit+1
]
is a directed edge in E (G) for each t =
1, 2, · · · , h − 1. For some pairs of (i, j), such a curve gij from xi to yj may fail to exist, due to
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reasons like geographical barriers, law restrictions, etc. If such curve does not exists, we set gij = 0
to denote the empty directed polyhedral curve. By doing so, we construct a matrix
(2.10) g = (gij)k×`
with each element of g being a polyhedral curve. A very simple example satisfying these conditions
is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2. A transport path from 4δx1 + 3δx2 + 4δx3 to 3δy1 + 5δy2 + 3δy3 with
g13 = 0, g31 = 0.
Definition 2.3. A pair (G, q) of a transport path G ∈ Path (a,b) and a transport plan q ∈
Plan (a,b) is compatible if qij = 0 whenever gij does not exist and
(2.11) G = q · g.
Here, the equation (2.11) means
G =
k∑
i=1
∑`
j=1
qijgij .
In terms of edges, it says that for each edge e ∈ E (G), we have∑
e⊆gij
qij = w (e) .
Example 2.1. Let x∗ ∈ X \ {x1, · · · , xk, y1, · · · , y`}. We may construct a path G¯ ∈ Path (a,b) as
follows. Let
V
(
G¯
)
= {x1, · · · , xk} ∪ {y1, · · · , y`} ∪ {x∗} ,
E
(
G¯
)
= {[xi, x∗] : i = 1, · · · , k} ∪ {[x∗, yj ] : j = 1, · · · , `} ,
and
w ([xi, x
∗]) = mi, w ([x∗, yj ]) = nj
for each i and j. In this case, each gij is the union of two edges [xi, x
∗] ∪ [x∗, yj ]. Then, each
transport plan q ∈ Plan (a,b) is compatible with G¯ because∑
[xi∗ ,x∗]⊆gij
qij =
∑`
j=1
qi∗j = mi∗ = w ([xi∗ , x
∗])
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and ∑
[x∗,yj∗ ]⊆gij
qij =
k∑
i=1
qij∗ = nj∗ = w ([x
∗, yj∗ ]) .
3. Exchange Value Of A Transport system
In a transport system, a transporter can simply ship the desired bundle to consumers as they have
initially planned. This is a universal strategy. However, we will see that allowing the exchange of
goods between consumers may make them better off without incurring any additional transportation
cost. In other words, there is an exchange value embedded in some transport system.
3.1. Exchange Value. For each probability measure q = (qij) ∈ P (X ×X), we define
(3.1) S (q) =
∑`
j=1
ej (pj , uj (qj)) =
∑`
j=1
min
{
pj · tj | tj ∈ Rk+, uj (tj) ≥ uj (qj)
}
,
where qj = (q1j , q2j , ..., qkj) for each j = 1, · · · , `. Here, S (q) represents the least total expenditure
for each individual j to reach utility level uj (qj) . One can simply use Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 to prove
the following lemma which shows several properties of this function S.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose each uj is continuous, concave, and increasing on Rk+, j = 1, ..., `. The
function S (q) is
(1) Homogeneous of degree one in p = (p1, ..., p`) .
(2) Increasing in q and nondecreasing in pij for any i = 1, ..., k, j = 1, ..., `.
(3) Concave in p.
(4) Continuous in p and q.
Let q¯ ∈ Plan (a,b) be the initial plan given by (2.2). Denote
(3.2) Ω (q¯) = {G ∈ Path (a,b) | (G, q¯) is compatible} .
Let G ∈ Ω (q¯) be fixed and g = (gij) be the corresponding matrix of G as given in (2.10). That
is,
G = g · q¯.
Then, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 3.1. Each transport plan in the set
(3.3) FG =
{
q ∈ P (X ×X)
∣∣∣∣ q is compatible with Guj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j) , j = 1, ..., `.
}
is called a feasible plan for G.
Recall that q is compatible with G means that
(3.4) qij = 0 if gij does not exist
and
g · q = g · q¯,
in the sense that for each edge e ∈ E (G), we have an equality
(3.5)
∑
e⊆gij
qij = w (e) , where w (e) =
∑
e⊆gij
q¯ij .
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For any feasible plan q ∈ FG, the constraint uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j) means that qj is at least as good as
q¯j for each consumer j.
Since q¯ ∈ Plan (a,b), the compatibility condition automatically implies that q ∈ Plan (a,b)
whenever q ∈ FG.
Lemma 3.2. FG is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of P (X ×X) .
Proof. Clearly, q¯ ∈ FG, showing that FG 6= ∅. The set FG is convex since it is an intersection of two
convex sets {q ∈ P (X ×X) | g · q = G } and ∏`j=1 {qj ∈ P (X ×X) |uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j)} , where the
convexity of {qj ∈ P (X ×X) |uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j)} comes from the concavity of uj , j = 1, ..., `. Since
each uj is continuous, we have FG is a closed subset of P (X ×X) and hence it is compact. 
Note that when G = G¯ as constructed in the example 2.1, we have
FG¯ = {q ∈ Plan (a,b) |uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j) , j = 1, ..., `} .
Clearly, for each G ∈ Path (a,b), we have
(3.6) q¯ ∈ FG ⊆ FG¯.
Definition 3.2. Let E be an economy as in (2.1). For each transport path G ∈ Ω (q¯), we define
the exchange value of G by
(3.7) V (G; E) = max
q∈FG
S (q)− S (q¯) ,
where S is given by (3.1). Without causing confusion, we may simply denote V (G; E) by V (G).
Since S is a continuous function on a compact set, the exchange value function V : Ω → [0,∞)
is well defined. Furthermore, for each q ∈ FG, given uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j) for all j, we have
(3.8) S (q) ≥ S (q¯) .
Remark 1. Our way of defining the feasibility set FG guarantees that the exchange value is not
obtained at the cost of increasing transportation cost. This is because the compatibility condition
ensures that replacing q¯ by any feasible plan q ∈ FG will not change the transportation cost Mα (G)
(to be defined later in (4.1)), as the quantity on each edge e of G is set to be w (e).
The following proposition shows that the exchange value is always nonnegative and bounded
from above.
Proposition 3.1. For any G ∈ Ω (q¯) ,
0 ≤ V (G) ≤ V (G¯) .
Proof. This follows from the definition as well as (3.6). 
Example 3.1. Let’s return to the example discussed in introduction. More precisely, suppose
u1 (q11, q21) = q11 +3q21, w1 = 1/2, p1 = (1, 6) and u2 (q12, q22) = 3q12 + q22, w2 = 1/2, p2 = (6, 1) .
By solving (2.2), i.e.
q¯1 ∈ arg max {u1 (q11, q21) | p1 · q1 ≤ w1}
= arg max {q11 + 3q21 | q11 + 6q21 ≤ 1/2}
= {(1/2, 0)} ,
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we find q¯1 = (1/2, 0). Similarly, we have q¯2 = (0, 1/2). This gives the initial plan
q¯ =
(
1/2 0
0 1/2
)
.
Now, solving expenditure minimization problems (2.3) yields
e1 (p1, u˜1) = min
{
p1 · q1 | q1 ∈ R2+, u1 (q1) ≥ u˜1
}
= min
{
q11 + 6q21 | (q11, q21) ∈ R2+, q11 + 3q21 ≥ u˜1
}
= u˜1.
Similarly, we have e2 (p2, u˜2) = u˜2. From these, we get
S (q) = e1 (p1, u1 (q1)) + e2 (p2, u2 (q2)) = u1 (q1) + u2 (q2)
for each probability measure q ∈ P (X ×X). Now, we find the exchange value embedded in the
transport systems G1 and G2 as given in Figure 1.
• G1 : The associated feasible set is
FG1 =
q =
(
q11 q12
q21 q22
)
∈ P (X ×X)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
q11 = 1/2, q21 = 0, q12 = 0, q22 = 1/2,
q11 + 3q21 ≥ u1 (q¯1) = 1/2,
3q12 + q22 ≥ u2 (q¯2) = 1/2.
 = {q¯} .
Thus, the exchange value of G1 is
V (G1) = max
q∈FG1
S (q)− S (q¯) = S (q¯)− S (q¯) = 0.
• G2 : The associated feasible set is
FG2 =
q =
(
q11 q12
q21 q22
)
∈ P (X ×X)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
q11 + q12 = 1/2, q21 + q22 = 1/2,
q11 + q21 = 1/2,
q11 + 3q21 ≥ u1 (q¯1) = 1/2,
3q12 + q22 ≥ u2 (q¯2) = 1/2.

=
{
q =
(
q11 1/2− q11
1/2− q11 q11
) ∣∣∣∣ q11 ≤ 1/2q11 ≥ 0 .
}
Thus, we have the following exchange value
V (G2) = max
q∈FG2
S (q)− S (q¯)
= max
q∈FG2
{(q11 + 3q21) + (3q12 + q22)} − 1
= max
0≤q11≤ 12
{(q11 + 3 (1/2− q11)) + (3 (1/2− q11) + q11)} − 1
= max
0≤q11≤ 12
{3− 4q11} − 1 = 2.
Basically, there are three factors affecting the size of exchange value: transport structures, pref-
erences and prices. In the rest of this section, we will study how these three factors affect the
exchange value.
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3.2. Transport Structures and Exchange Value. For any G ∈ Ω (q¯), define
K (q¯, G) = {q ∈ P (X ×X) |q is compatible with G} ,
and
U (q¯) = {q ∈ P (X ×X) |uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j) , j = 1, ..., `.}
Then,
FG = K (q¯, G) ∩ U (q¯) .
Clearly, the structure of a transport system influences the exchange value through K (q¯, G) . For
this consideration, this subsection will focus on the properties of K (q¯, G) whose implications on
exchange value will be self-evident in the following subsections.
Proposition 3.2. K (q¯, G) is a polygon of dimension N (G) + χ (G)− (k + `), where χ (G) is the
Euler Characteristic number of G, and N (G) is the total number of existing gij’s in G.
Proof. For each interior vertex v of G, let {e1, e2, · · · , eh} ⊆ E (G) be the set of edges with e−i = v.
Then, each ei corresponds to an equation of the form (3.5). Nevertheless, due to the balance
equation (2.6), we may remove one redundant equation from these h equations. As a result, the
total number of equations of the form (3.5) equals the total number of edges of G minus the total
number of interior vertices of G. Thus, K (q¯, G) is defined by k+`−χ (G) number of linear equations
in the form of (3.5), and (k`−N (G)) number of equations (3.4). This shows that K (q¯, G) is a
convex polygon of dimension
(3.9) dim (K (q¯, G)) ≥ k`− (k + `− χ (G))− (k`−N (G)) = N (G) + χ (G)− (k + `) .
By the following Lemma 3.3, we have an inequality of the other direction. 
Lemma 3.3. The dimension of K (q¯, G) is no more than N (G) + χ (G)− (k + `).
Proof. Since K (q¯, G) is defined by k` variables (qij)k×` which satisfy equations (3.4) and (3.5). As
the number of equations (3.4) is k`−N (G), it is sufficient to show that
rank (A) ≥ k`− (k`−N (G))− (N (G) + χ (G)− (k + `)) = (k + `− χ (G)) ,
where A is the coefficient matrix given by linear equations (3.5). We prove this by using induction
on the number k. When k = 1, then the coefficient matrix A(1) is in the form of
A(1) =
(
I
B
)
,
where I is the N
(
G(1)
) × N (G(1)) identity matrix IN(G(1)), and B is some matrix of N (G(1))
columns. Thus, the rank of A(1) is N
(
G(1)
)
. On the other hand, the Euler Characteristic number
of G(1) is
χ
(
G(1)
)
= 1 +
(
`−N
(
G(1)
))
,
which gives
(3.10) rank
(
A(1)
)
= (1 + `)− χ
(
G(1)
)
.
Now, we may use induction by assuming that
(3.11) rank
(
A(k)
)
≥ (k + `)− χ
(
G(k)
)
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for any G(k) from k sources to ` consumers. We want to show that
rank
(
A(k+1)
)
≥ (k + `+ 1)− χ
(
G(k+1)
)
for any G(k+1) from (k + 1) sources to ` consumers.
Let
E
(k+1)
1 =
{
e ∈ E
(
G(k+1)
)
: e ⊆ gij for some i ∈ {1, · · · , k} and j ∈ {1, · · · , `}
}
E
(k+1)
2 = E
(
G(k+1)
)
\ E(k+1)1 .
For each e ∈ E(k+1)2 , we know e ⊆ g(k+1)j for some j ∈ {1, · · · , `}, but e /∈ E(k+1)1 . Then, for each
e ∈ E(k+1)1 , we have ∑
1≤i≤k,1≤j≤`
e⊆gij
qij +
∑
1≤j≤`
e⊆g(k+1)j
q(k+1)j = w (e) .
Also, for each e ∈ E(k+1)2 , we have ∑
1≤j≤`
e⊆g(k+1)j
q(k+1)j = w (e) .
As a result, the matrix A(k+1) can be expressed in the form
(3.12) A(k+1) =
(
A(k) B(k+1)
0 C(k+1)
)
.
Now, we consider a new transport path
G˜ =
∑
e∈E(k+1)2
w (e) [e] .
from a single source (i.e. xk+1) to a few (say ˜` ) targets (, which do not necessarily belong to the
original consumers). The matrix C(k+1) here is the associated A(1) matrix for G˜, and thus has rank(
1 + ˜`
)
− χ
(
G˜
)
= ˜` as G˜ is contractible. Also, we have
χ
(
G(k+1)
)
= χ
(
G(k)
)
+ 1− ˜`.
Therefore, by (3.11) and (3.12),
rank
(
A(k+1)
)
≥ rank
(
A(k)
)
+ rank
(
C(k+1)
)
≥ (k + `)− χ
(
G(k)
)
+
(
1 + χ
(
G(k)
)
− χ
(
G(k+1)
))
= (k + 1 + `)− χ
(
G(k+1)
)
.

Corollary 3.1. Suppose G ∈ Ω (q¯).
(1) If k + ` ≥ N (G) + χ (G), then FG = {q¯}.
(2) If k + ` < N (G) + χ (G) and q¯ is an interior point of the polygon K (q¯, G), then FG is a
convex set of positive dimension. In particular, FG 6= {q¯} .
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Proof. If k + ` ≥ N (G) + χ (G), the convex polygon K (q¯, G) becomes a dimension zero set, and
thus FG = {q¯}. When k + ` < N (G) + χ (G), the polygon K (q¯, G) has positive dimension. Since
each uj is concave, U (q¯) is a convex set containing q¯. When q¯ is an interior point of K (q¯, G), the
intersection FG = K (q¯, G) ∩ U (q¯) is still a convex set of positive dimension. Thus, FG 6= {q¯}. 
Proposition 3.3. Suppose G ∈ Ω (q¯) satisfies the following condition: for any two pairs (i1, i2)
with i1 6= i2 and (j1, j2) with j1 6= j2, we have
(3.13) V (gi1j2) ∩ V (gi2j1) = ∅,
where V (gij) is given in (2.9). Then, k + ` ≥ N (G) + χ (G). Hence, by Corollary 3.1, FG is a
singleton {q¯}.
Proof. We still use the notations that have been used in the proof of Lemma 3.3. When k = 1,
χ (G) = 1 + ` −N (G), and thus k + ` = N (G) + χ (G). By using induction, we assume that the
result is true for any k sources. We want to show that it holds for k+ 1 sources. Suppose there are
totally d edges of G(k+1) connecting the vertex xk+1, then as discussed earlier, we may construct a
transport path G˜ from a single source xk+1 to a few targets
{
v1, v2, · · · , v˜`
}
with vi ∈ V
(
G(k)
)
.
For each vj , it corresponds to a unique g(k+1)j∗ for some j
∗ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , `} that passing through
the vertex vj . Indeed, suppose both g(k+1)j1 and g(k+1)j2 passing through vj with j1 6= j2. Since
vj ∈ V
(
G(k)
)
, there exists an i∗ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} such that xi∗ and vj are connected by a directed
curve lying in G(k). Then, vj ∈ gi∗j2 ∩ g(k+1)j1 , which contradicts condition (3.13). As a result,
N
(
G(k+1)
)
= N
(
G(k)
)
+ ˜`.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that χ
(
G(k+1)
)
= χ
(
G(k)
)
+ 1− ˜`. So, by induction,
(k + 1) + ` ≥ 1 +N
(
G(k)
)
+ χ
(
G(k)
)
= 1 +
(
N
(
G(k+1)
)
− ˜`
)
+
(
χ
(
G(k+1)
)
+ ˜`− 1
)
= N
(
G(k+1)
)
+ χ
(
G(k+1)
)
.
This shows that
k + ` ≥ N (G) + χ (G)
for any G satisfying condition (3.13). Therefore, FG is a singleton {q¯}. 
In Proposition 3.2, we will consider an inverse problem of Proposition 3.3 under some suitable
conditions on the prices.
Given two transport paths
G1 = {V (G1) , E (G1) , w1 : E (G1)→ [0,+∞)} and
G2 = {V (G2) , E (G2) , w2 : E (G2)→ [0,+∞)} ,
we say G1 is topologically equivalent to G2 if there exists a homeomorphism h : X → X such that
V (G2) = h (V (G1)) ,
E (G2) = {h (e) : e ∈ E (G1)}
and w2 (h (e)) = w1 (e) for each e ∈ E (G1) .
Clearly, if G1 is topologically equivalent to G2, then K (q¯, G1) = K (q¯, G2). As a result, we know
V is topologically invariant:
Proposition 3.4. If G1 is topologically equivalent to G2, then V (G1) = V (G2).
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As will be clear in the next section, the topological invariance of V is a very useful result because
it enables us to inherit many existing theories in ramified optimal transportation when studying a
new optimal transport problem there.
3.3. Preferences and Exchange Value. In this subsection, we will study the implications of pref-
erences, which are represented by utility functions, on the exchange value. The following proposition
shows that there is no exchange value when all consumers derive their utilities solely from the total
amount of goods they consume.
Proposition 3.5. If uj : Rk+ → R is of the form uj (qj) = fj
(∑k
i=1 qij
)
for some fj : [0,∞)→ R
for each j = 1, ..., `, then V (G) = 0 for any G ∈ Ω (q¯).
Proof. For any q ∈ FG, by compatibility, we know
k∑
i=1
qij =
k∑
i=1
q¯ij , j = 1, ..., `,
which implies
uj (qj) = fj
(
k∑
i=1
qij
)
= fj
(
k∑
i=1
q¯ij
)
= uj (q¯j) ,
showing that all consumers find any feasible plan indifferent to q¯. Therefore, we get
V (G) = max
q∈FG
S (q)− S (q¯) = 0.

For any G ∈ Ω (q¯), denote Q (G) as the solution set of the maximization problem (3.7) defining
exchange value, i.e.,
(3.14) Q (G) = {qˆ ∈ FG | V (G) = S (qˆ)− S (q¯)} .
We are interested in describing geometric properties of the set Q (G). In particular, if Q (G) contains
only one element, then the problem (3.7) has a unique solution.
Proposition 3.6. For any G ∈ Ω (q¯) ,
(1) The solution set Q (G) is a compact nonempty set.
(2) If uj : Rk+ → R is homogeneous of degree βj > 0 and (uj (qj))
1
βj is concave in qj , j = 1, ..., `,
then Q (G) is convex.
(3) (Uniqueness) If uj : Rk+ → R is homogeneous of degree βj > 0 and (uj (qj))
1
βj is concave
in qj satisfying the condition
(3.15) (uj ((1− λj) q˜j + λj qˆj))
1
βj > (1− λj) (uj (q˜j))
1
βj + λj (uj (qˆj))
1
βj
for each λj ∈ (0, 1), and any non-collinear q˜j , qˆj ∈ Rk+ , for each j = 1, ..., `. Then Q (G) is
a singleton, and thus the problem (3.7) has a unique solution.
Proof. Since the function S (q) is continuous in q, Q (G) becomes a closed subset of the compact
set FG, and thus Q (G) is also compact.
If uj : Rk+ → R is homogeneous of degree βj > 0, then Lemma 2.2 implies that
(3.16) ej (pj , uj (qj)) = ej (pj , 1) (uj (qj))
1
βj and S (q) =
∑`
j=1
ej (pj , 1) (uj (qj))
1
βj .
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Thus, when each (uj (qj))
1
βj is concave in qj , we have S is concave in q. Now, for any q
∗, q˜ ∈ Q (G)
and λ ∈ [0, 1] , the convexity of FG implies (1− λ) q∗ + λq˜ ∈ FG and the concavity of S implies
(3.17) S ((1− λ) q∗ + λq˜)− S (q¯) ≥ (1− λ) (S (q∗)− S (q¯)) + λ (S (q˜)− S (q¯)) = V (G) ,
showing that (1− λ) q∗ + λq˜ ∈ Q (G) . Therefore, Q (G) is convex.
To prove the uniqueness, we note that (1− λ) q∗ + λq˜ ∈ Q (G) implies an equality in (3.17), i.e.,
(3.18)
(
uj
(
(1− λ) q∗j + λq˜j
)) 1
βj = (1− λ) (uj (q∗j )) 1βj + λ (uj (q˜j)) 1βj
for each λ ∈ (0, 1), and each j = 1, 2, · · · , `. When (uj (qj))
1
βj is concave in qj and satisfies (3.15),
the equality (3.18) implies that q∗j and q˜j are collinear in the sense that q
∗
j = tj q˜j for some tj ≥ 0.
By (2.8),
nj =
∑
i
q∗ij =
∑
i
tj q˜ij = tj
∑
j
q˜ij = tjnj .
Therefore, tj = 1 as nj > 0. This shows q
∗ = q˜ and thus Q (G) is a singleton with an element q˜. 
Two classes of utility functions widely used in economics satisfy conditions in Proposition (3.6).
One is Cobb-Douglas function ([27])
u : Rk+ → R : u (q1, ..., qk) =
k∏
i=1
(qi)
τi , τi > 0, i = 1, ..., k.
The other is Constant Elasticity of Substitution function ([27])
u : Rk+ → R : u (q1, ..., qk) =
[
k∑
i=1
γi (qi)
τ
] β
τ
, τ ∈ (0, 1), β > 0, γi > 0, i = 1, ..., k.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose uj : Rk+ → R is homogeneous of degree βj > 0 and (uj (qj))
1
βj is concave
in qj satisfying (3.15) for each j = 1, ..., `. For any G ∈ Ω (q¯) , V (G) > 0 if and only if FG 6= {q¯}.
Proof. Clearly, if FG = {q¯}, then V (G) = 0. On the other hand, suppose V (G) = maxq∈FG S (q)−
S (q¯) = 0, then by (3.8), we have
S (q) = S (q¯) for each q ∈ FG.
This implies Q (G) = FG. By proposition 3.6, FG is a singleton {q¯}. 
This proposition says that each transport path G ∈ Ω (q¯) has a positive exchange value as long
as FG contains more than one element.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose uj : Rk+ → R is homogeneous of degree βj > 0 and (uj (qj))
1
βj is concave
in qj satisfying (3.15) for each j = 1, ..., `. If k + ` < N (G) + χ (G) and q¯ is an interior point of
the polygon K (q¯, G), then V (G) > 0.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 3.7 and Corollary 3.1. 
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3.4. Prices and Exchange Value. In this subsection, we show that one can observe the collinear-
ity in prices to determine the existence of a positive exchange value.
Proposition 3.8. If the price vectors are collinear, i.e., pj = λjp1, for some λj > 0, j = 1, ..., `,
then V (G) = 0 for any G ∈ Ω (q¯).
Proof. Assume that V (G) > 0. Then we know there exists a feasible plan q ∈ FG such that
uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j), j = 1, ..., `, with at least one strict inequality. Without loss of generality, we
assume uj∗ (qj∗) > uj∗ (q¯j∗) . For any j = 1, ..., `, uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j) implies pj · qj ≥ pj · q¯j . If not,
i.e., pj · qj < pj · q¯j , then by the monotonicity of uj , we can find a q˜j ∈ Rk+ such that q˜j > qj ,
uj (q˜j) > uj (qj) ≥ uj (q¯j) and pj · q˜j < pj · q¯j ,
contradicting the assumption that q¯j solves the utility maximization problem (2.2) of consumer
j. Furthermore, for consumer j∗, by definition of q¯j∗ , the inequality u2 (qj∗) > uj∗ (q¯j∗) implies
pj∗ · qj∗ > pj∗ · q¯j∗ . Thus, we know pj · qj ≥ pj · q¯j for all j with a strict inequality for j = j∗. Since
pj = λjp1, j = 1, ..., `, we know p1 · qj ≥ p1 · q¯j for all j with a strict inequality for j = j∗. Summing
over j yields ∑`
j=1
p1 · qj >
∑`
j=1
p1 · q¯j .
Meanwhile, the feasibility of q implies
∑`
j=1 qj =
∑`
j=1 q¯j . Multiplying both sides by p1 leads to∑`
j=1
p1 · qj =
∑`
j=1
p1 · q¯j ,
a contradiction. 
Corollary 3.2. If there is only one good (k = 1) or one consumer (` = 1), then V (G) = 0 for any
G ∈ Ω (q¯).
Proof. When k = 1, define λj =
pj
p1
> 0, j = 1, ..., `. The result follows from Proposition 3.8. When
` = 1, for any G ∈ Ω (q¯) , the feasible set is
FG = {q1 = (q11, · · · , qk1) ∈ Plan (a,b) |qi1 = mi = q¯i1 for each i} = {q¯1} ,
which clearly yields V (G) = 0. 
Proposition 3.9. Let k = 2 and ` = 2. Suppose uj is differentiable at q¯ with ∇uj (q¯j) > 0, j = 1, 2
and q¯ij > 0 for each i, j. If G ∈ Ω (q¯) with
(3.19) V (g12) ∩ V (g21) 6= ∅, and p21 > p11, p12 > p22,
then V (G) > 0.
Proof. Since g12 and g21 overlap, we denote γ2 to be the curve where g12 and g21 overlap with
endpoints z1 and z2. Let γ1,γ3, γ4 and γ5 be the corresponding curves from x1 to z1, z2 to y1, x2
to z1, and z2 to y2 respectively. Then, these γi’s are disjoint except at their endpoints. See Figure
3. Now, we may express gij ’s as
g11 = γ1 + γ2 + γ3,
g21 = γ4 + γ2 + γ3,
g12 = γ1 + γ2 + γ5,
g22 = γ4 + γ2 + γ5,
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which imply
(3.20) g11 + g22 = g12 + g21.
Figure 3. A positive exchange value
Now, let
q˜ = q¯ +
( − 
 −
)
,
where  is a sufficiently small positive number. Then, by (3.20),
g · q˜ = g ·
(
q¯ +
( − 
 −
))
= g · q¯ +  (−g11 + g12 + g21 − g22) = g · q¯,
which shows that q˜ is compatible with G. Now, we show u1 (q˜1) > u1 (q¯1). Since q¯1 = (q¯11, q¯21) ∈
R2++ is derived from the utility maximization problem (2.2) of consumer 1, it must satisfy the first
order condition at q¯1:
(3.21) ∂u1 (q¯1) /∂q1 = λp11 and ∂u1 (q¯1) /∂q2 = λp21
for some λ > 0. Thus, using Taylor’s Theorem, we have
u1 (q˜1) = u1 (q¯1) +
∂u1 (q¯1)
∂q11
(q˜11 − q¯11) + ∂u1 (q¯1)
∂q21
(q˜21 − q¯21) + o ()
= u1 (q¯1) + λp11 (−) + λp21+ o () , by (3.21)
= u1 (q¯1) + λ (p21 − p11) + o ()
> u1 (q¯1) , by (3.19).
Similarly, we have u2 (q˜2) > u2 (q¯2). This shows that q˜ ∈ FG. By Lemma 2.1, we have S (q˜) > S (q¯),
and thus
V (G) = max
q∈FG
S (q)− S (q¯) ≥ S (q˜)− S (q¯) > 0.

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Theorem 3.2. Suppose uj is differentiable at q¯ with ∇uj (q¯j) ∈ Rk++, j = 1, ..., `, and q¯ ∈ Rk`++. If
there exists some i1 6= i2 ∈ {1, ..., k}, j1 6= j2 ∈ {1, ..., `} satisfies
pi2j1 > pi1j1 , pi1j2 > pi2j2 and V (gi1j2) ∩ V (gi2j1) 6= ∅
for G ∈ Ω (q¯), then V (G) > 0.
Proof. This follows from an analogous proof of proposition 3.9, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. A ramified transport system with positive exchange value.
To conclude this section, we’ve seen how transport structures, preferences and prices jointly
determine the exchange values. Each of these factors may lead to a zero exchange value under very
rare situations. More precisely, when the structure of the transport system yields a singleton feasible
set FG (Corollary 3.1, Proposition 3.3), or the utility functions are merely quantity dependent
(Proposition 3.5), or price vectors are collinear across consumers (Proposition 3.8), the exchange
value is zero. However, under more regular situations, there exists a positive exchange value for
a ramified transport system. For instance, if the utility functions satisfy the conditions in (3) of
Theorem 3.1 with a non-singleton feasible set FG (Theorem 3.1) or the transport systems are of
ramified structures with some non collinear price vectors (Theorem 3.2), there exists a positive
exchange value.
4. A New Optimal Transport Problem
In the previous section, we have considered the exchange value V (G) for any G ∈ Ω (q¯). A
natural question would be whether there exists a G∗ that maximizes V (G) among all G ∈ Ω (q¯).
The answer to this question has already been provided in Proposition 3.1 as the particular transport
path G¯ ∈ Ω (q¯) is an obvious maximizer. However, despite the fact that G¯ maximizes exchange
value, it may be inefficient when accounting for transportation cost. Nevertheless, as indicated
previously, one should not neglect the benefit of obtaining an exchange value from a transport
system. As a result, it is reasonable to consider both transportation cost and exchange value
together when designing a transport system.
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Recall that in [33] etc, a ramified transport system is modeled by a transport path between two
probability measures a and b. For each transport path G ∈ Path (a,b) and any α ∈ [0, 1], the Mα
cost of G is defined by
(4.1) Mα (G) :=
∑
e∈E(G)
w (e)
α
length (e) .
When α < 1, a “Y-shaped” path from two sources to one target is usually more preferable than
a “V-shaped” path. In general, a transport path with a branching structure may be more cost
efficient than the one with a “linear” structure. A transport path G ∈ Path (a,b) is called an
α−optimal transport path if it is an Mα minimizer in Path (a,b).
Based on the above discussions, we propose the following minimization problem.
Problem 4.1. Given two atomic probability measures a and b on X in an economy E given by
(2.1), find a minimizer of
(4.2) Hα,σ (G) := Mα (G)− σV (G)
among all G ∈ Ω (q¯), where Ω (q¯) is given by (3.2), and α ∈ [0, 1) and σ ≥ 0 are fixed constants.
When the utility functions are merely quantity dependent (Proposition 3.5) or when price vectors
are collinear across consumers (Proposition 3.8), the exchange value of any G ∈ Ω (q¯) is always zero.
In these cases, Hα,σ (G) = Mα (G) for any σ. Thus, the study of Hα,σ coincides with that of Mα,
which can be found in existing literature (e.g. [33], [7]). However, as seen in the previous section,
it is quite possible that Hα,σ does not agree with Mα on Ω (q¯) for σ > 0 in a general economy E .
As V is topologically invariant (Proposition 3.4), many results that can be found in literature
about Mα still hold for Hα,σ. For instance, the Melzak algorithm for finding an Mα minimizer
([28], [19], [7]) in a fixed topological class still applies to Hα,σ because V (G) is simply a constant
within each topological class. Also, as the balance equation (2.6) still holds, one can still calculate
angles between edges at each vertex using existing formulas ([33]), and then get a universal upper
bound on the degree of vertices on an optimal Hα,σ path.
However, due to the existence of exchange value, one may possibly favor an optimal Hα,σ path
instead of the usual optimal Mα path when designing a transport system. The topological type of
the optimal Hα,σ path may differ from that of the optimal Mα path. This observation is illustrated
by the following example.
(a) G1 (b) G2 (c) G3
Figure 5. Three topologically different transport systems.
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Example 4.1. Let us consider the transportation from two sources to two consumers. If we only
consider minimizing Mα transportation cost, each of the three topologically different types shown
in Figure 5 may occur. However, when σ is sufficiently large, only G2 in Figure 5b may be selected
under suitable conditions of u and p. This is because G2 has a positive exchange value which does
not exist in either G1 or G3.
References
[1] L. Ambrosio. Lecture notes on optimal transport problems. Mathematical aspects of evolving interfaces (Funchal,
2000), 1–52, Lecture Notes in Math., 1812, Springer, Berlin, 2003.
[2] K. Arrow. and F. Hahn. General Equilibrium Analysis. San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1971.
[3] Y. Brenier. De´composition polaire et re´arrangement monotone des champs de vecteurs. C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris
Se´r. I Math. 305 (1987), no. 19, 805–808.
[4] L.A. Caffarelli; M. Feldman; R. J. McCann. Constructing optimal maps for Monge’s transport problem as a
limit of strictly convex costs. J. Amer. Math. Soc. 15 (2002), no. 1, 1–26
[5] A. Brancolini, G. Buttazzo, F. Santambrogio, Path functions over Wasserstein spaces. J. Eur. Math. Soc. Vol.
8, No.3 (2006),415–434.
[6] M. Bernot; V. Caselles; J. Morel, Traffic plans. Publ. Mat. 49 (2005), no. 2, 417–451.
[7] M. Bernot; V. Caselles; J. Morel; Optimal Transportation Networks: Models and Theory. Series: Lecture Notes
in Mathematics , Vol. 1955 , (2009).
[8] G. Buttazzo and G. Carlier. Optimal spatial pricing strategies with transportation costs. To appear in Contemp.
Math..
[9] J. Chipman and J. Moore. Compensating Variation, Consumer’s Surplus, and Welfare. American Economic
Review, Vol 70, No. 5, 1980, 933-949.
[10] T. De Pauw and R. Hardt. Size minimization and approximating problems, Calc. Var. Partial Differential
Equations 17 (2003), 405-442.
[11] G. Devillanova and S. Solimini. On the dimension of an irrigable measure. Rend. Semin. Mat. Univ. Padova 117
(2007), 1–49.
[12] G. Debreu. The Coefficient of Resource Utilization, Econometrica, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1951, 273-292.
[13] G. Debreu. Theory of Value. Wiley, New York, 1959.
[14] J. Eaton and S. Kortum. Technology, Geography, and Trade, Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 5, 2002, 1741-1779.
[15] L.C. Evans and R. Gariepy. Measure theory and fine properites of functions. Stud. Adv. M ath., CRC Press,
1992
[16] L. C. Evans; W. Gangbo. Differential equations methods for the Monge-Kantorovich mass transfer problem.
Mem. Amer. Math. Soc. 137 (1999), no. 653.
[17] A. Figalli, Y.H. Kim and R.J. McCann. When is multidimensional screening a convex program? Preprint (2010).
[18] W. Gangbo; R. J. McCann. The geometry of optimal transportation. Acta Math. 177 (1996), no. 2, 113–161.
[19] E.N. Gilbert. Minimum cost communication networks, Bell System Tech. J. 46, (1967), pp. 2209-2227.
[20] R. Jordan, D. Kinderlehrer and F. Otto. The variational formulation of the Fokker-Planck equation. SIAM J.
Math. Anal. 29,1 (1998), 1-17.
[21] L. Kantorovich. On the translocation of masses. C.R. (Doklady) Acad. Sci. URSS (N.S.), 37:199-201, 1942.
[22] T. Koopmans. Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1957.
[23] O. Lange. The Foundation of Welfare Economics, Econometrica, Vol. 10, No. 3/4, 1942, 215-228.
[24] X. Ma, N. Trudinger, and X.J. Wang. Regularity of potential functions of the optimal transportation problem.
Arch. Rat. Mech. Anal., 177(2005), 151-183.
[25] F. Maddalena, S. Solimini and J.M. Morel. A variational model of irrigation patterns, Interfaces and Free
Boundaries, Volume 5, Issue 4, (2003), pp. 391-416.
[26] G. Monge. Me´moire sur la the´orie des de´blais et de remblais, Histoire de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences de
Paris, avec les Me´morires de Mathe´matique et de Physique pour la meˆme anne´e, pages 666-704 (1781).
[27] A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
[28] Z.A. Melzak. On the problem of Steiner, Canad. Math. Bull. 4 (1961) 143-148.
[29] E. Paolini and E. Stepanov. Optimal transportation networks as flat chains. Interfaces and Free Boundaries, 8
(2006), 393-436.
[30] P. Samuelson. Foundations of Economic Analysis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1947.
[31] C. Villani. Topics in mass transportation. AMS Graduate Studies in Math. 58 (2003).
20 QINGLAN XIA AND SHAOFENG XU
[32] B. White. Rectifiability of flat chains. Annals of Mathematics 150 (1999), no. 1, 165-184.
[33] Q. Xia. Optimal paths related to transport problems. Communications in Contemporary Mathematics. Vol. 5,
No. 2 (2003) 251-279.
[34] Q. Xia. Interior regularity of optimal transport paths. Calculus of Variations and Partial Differential Equations.
20 (2004), no. 3, 283–299.
[35] Q. Xia. Boundary regularity of optimal transport paths. Preprint.
[36] Q. Xia. The formation of tree leaf. ESAIM Control Optim. Calc. Var. 13 (2007), no. 2, 359–377.
[37] Q. Xia. The geodesic problem in quasimetric spaces. Journal of Geometric Analysis. Volume 19, Issue2 (2009),
452–479.
[38] Q. Xia and A. Vershynina. On the transport dimension of measures. SIAM J. Math. Anal. Volume 41, Issue 6,
pp. 2407-2430 (2010).
[39] G. Xue, T. Lillys and D. Dougherty. Computing the Minimum Cost Pipe Network Interconnecting One Sink
and Many Sources. SIAM Journal on Optimization. Volume 10 , Issue 1 (1999) Pages: 22 - 42 .
[40] Zhang and Zhu. A bilevel programming method for pipe network optimization. SIAM Journal on Optimization,
Vol 6, 838 (1996).
(Q. Xia) University of California at Davis, Department of Mathematics, Davis, CA, 95616
E-mail address: qlxia@math.ucdavis.edu
URL: http://math.ucdavis.edu/~qlxia
(S. Xu) University of California at Davis, Department of Economics, Davis, CA, 95616
E-mail address: sxu@ucdavis.edu
